Persistent Exploitation with Intertemporal Reproducible Solution in Pre-industrial Economies by Chen, Weikai & Yoshihara, Naoki
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2019
Persistent Exploitation with Intertemporal
Reproducible Solution in Pre-industrial Economies
Weikai Chen
University of Massachusetts Amherst, weikaichen@umass.edu
Naoki Yoshihara
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, nyoshihara@econs.umass.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chen, Weikai and Yoshihara, Naoki, "Persistent Exploitation with Intertemporal Reproducible Solution in Pre-industrial Economies"
(2019). UMass Amherst Economics Working Papers. 268.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/268
Persistent Exploitation with Intertemporal
Reproducible Solution in Pre-industrial Economies∗
Weikai Chen† Naoki Yoshihara‡
April 27, 2019
Abstract
This paper presents an intertemporal model of pre-industrial economies defined
with leisure preference to study the condition of the emergence and persistence of
exploitation as unequal exchange of labor. We show that pure workers are exploited
in any finite periods if there is positive real profit rate, even though labor allocation
among agents tends to be equalized in the limit regardless of the saving behaviors.
The so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem and Profit-Exploitation Correspon-
dence Principle are generalized in the intertemporal setting with exploitation in the
whole life, and the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle is established with
exploitation within period.
JEL classification: D51; D63; C61; B51
Keywords: Exploitation; Unequal Exchange of Labor; Persistence; Asymptotically
Egalitarian
∗The research for this paper was supported by a Chair’s Summer Research Fellowship (2018), De-
partment of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
†Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; weikaichen@umass.edu
‡Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; and Institute of Economic Re-
search, Hitotsubashi University
1
1 Introduction
In Marxian economics, exploitation associated with class structure is an enduring char-
acteristic of capitalism. It has been shown that one can find an appropriate definition
of exploitation that is both logically coherent and empirically meaningful (Veneziani &
Yoshihara, 2015, 2017b; Yoshihara, 2010). However, the research on mechanisms gener-
ating persistent exploitation is still ongoing (e.g., Galanis, Veneziani, & Yoshihara, 2019;
Kaneko & Yoshihara, 2019; Skillman, 2017; Veneziani, 2013).
In this paper, we focus on the dynamics of exploitation in pre-industrial capitalist
economies within an intertemporal framework, and establish the relationship among
exploitation, positive profits and class status. The main contribution of this paper is
showing (i) the persistence of exploitation at equilibrium (reproducible solution) in the
sense that pure workers are exploited in any finite periods if there is positive real profits
and (ii) the asymptotically egalitarian allocation of labor time at equilibrium — each
agent tends to supply to same labor time in the infinite limit — regardless of the their
saving behavior.
In our model of economies with linear technology, producers are assumed to choose
labor supply and plan of investments on both production and speculation to minimize
lifelong labor time, or equivalently maximize utility representing the so-called leisure
preference — once subsistence good is secured agents prefer to enjoy as much leisure
time as possible. This simple model of subsistence economy is not just a first step in
theory before studying a more general accumulating economy, but also a reasonable ap-
proximation of the pre-industrial capitalism before the new time-discipline was imposed
by the eighteenth century (e.g., Cunningham, 1980, 2014; Thompson, 1967).
Moreover, we assume production takes one period of time. Outputs generated in this
period is used as inputs in the next, and therefore the sell of outputs in period t and
the purchase of inputs in t+ 1 are just two sides of the same coin and thus should have
the same prices. Then for the production in period t, the prices of inputs (same as the
prices of outputs in the previous period) could be different from that of outputs (same
as the prices of inputs in the next period). For this reason, we relax the conventional
assumption of stationary prices, which would have substantial effects on the asymptotic
behavior of the prices (see Lemma 4.2).
We first generalize Roemer (1980)’s equilibrium concept of reproducible solution (RS)
to the intertemporal setting. The concept of RS is a Marxian refinement of general
competitive equilibrium with reproducibility, from which we derive aggregate properties
of the production activity and characterizations of the price system.
To reproduce the economy as a whole, each agent should have the subsistence con-
sumption bundle, which implies that the total subsistence goods should be produced as
net outputs and thus every commodity must be produced, which has several consequences
as follows: (i) The individual constraints must be binding in order to be consistent with
the aggregate properties — each agent should use up all the stock of materials she owns
in production and the total income must just meet the expense since they are so in the
social level; (ii) There must be a uniform profit rate — otherwise no one would invest
on the sector with low profit rate; (iii) by applying the same argument to the trade-off
between production and speculation, we have the non-negative real profit, i.e., the profit
rate must be large sufficient to induce the agents to invest the stock of materials on
production rather than carrying them to the next period. Moreover, by considering the
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intertemporal trade-offs of allocation labor time along the life, we establish the Euler
equation for the minimization problem, i.e., 1/wt = (1 + pit)/wt+1 — the additional
amount of labor to earn one more dollar should equal to the amount of labor saved
thanks to the return from the additional dollar.
With the help of these characteristics of prices system, we derive the lifelong labor
time as a function of initial endowment and prices irregardless of the saving behaviors.
While in each period, the agent should supply sufficient labor to earn revenue that
could cover the gap between total expenditure and the property income. Since both the
expenditure and property income within period are influenced by the saving behavior,
we could have different reproducible solutions with the same prices and total labor time
but different allocations of labor time along the life.
We then define exploitation as unequal exchange of labor (UEL) in the intertemporal
RS by generalizing the standard Okishio (1963)–Morishima (1973) formula. At an RS,
an agent is said to be exploited if she receives less labor than she supplies. To elaborate
this idea in the intertemporal setting, we consider the exploitative status within period t
(WPt) and that in the whole life (WL), since they may not be identical with each other
when saving is allowed. Then the first question is: Which definition of exploitation is
appropriate to discuss its relationship with class status and profits?
This is answered by Theorem 1, the first main result in this paper, in which we
show (i) the equivalence of WL exploitation and the possibility of positive real profits in
economies with inegalitarian endowments, the fundamental Marxian theorem (FMT);
(ii) the profit-exploitation correspondence principle (PECP) that each propertyless
workers are WL exploited if and only if there is possibility of positive real profits; and (iii)
the correspondence of WPt exploitation and class status in the sense that pure workers
are WPt exploited while capitalists are WPt exploiting, the so-called class-exploitation
correspondence principle (CECP). Therefore, when discuss the relationship between ex-
ploitation and profits, the WL exploitation is appropriate since it takes account of the
historical factors (e.g., Wolff, 1999, p. 117), while WPt exploitation is proper with re-
spect to the relation with class structure, as both of them vary with the saving behavior.
Moreover, we show that for the interior RS (RS without saving), all the three principles
mentioned above are established with WPt exploitation.
Finally, we tackle the main issue of this paper — the long-run behavior of exploita-
tion — by first providing a formal definition of persistence. Exploitation is persistent
if it exists in any finite periods, which should be distinguished from the limiting be-
havior described by asymptotics. Persistent exploitation could be consistent with the
asymptotically egalitarian allocation of labor time, even the latter could be interpreted
as exploitation disappears in the infinite limit. This distinction would help us clarify the
implications of Theorem 3, the second main result in our paper, stating that any RS is
asymptotically egalitarian — allocation of labor time among agents would tend to be
equalized in the limit.
This result, which is observed in existing literature with interior RS (e.g., Kaneko
& Yoshihara, 2019; Veneziani, 2007), is established with RS in general without any
restriction on saving behavior for the first time. It may be interpreted as an impossibility
theorem since it implies that exploitation disappears at the limit. However, such a
limiting behavior could be consistent with the persistence of exploitation in the sense that
exploitation exists in any finite period. Indeed, we show that pure workers are exploited
all the time except in the limit if there is possibility of positive profits (Proposition 4).
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We argue that persistence of exploitation is sufficient to capture the Marxian idea of
exploitation as an enduring characteristics of capitalism, and asymptotically egalitarian
labor allocation or the disappearance of exploitation in the limit is also consistent with
the Marxian view of capitalism as one stage in human history that is neither sustainable
nor permanent. Therefore, we might ask too much in the search of the mechanism
that generates RS without asymptotically egalitarian labor allocation. Nevertheless,
the result that labor allocation tends to be equalized does provide us some information
about the long-run behavior of exploitation. It implies that after some point the degree
of exploitation can be arbitrary small, if we measure it by the difference between labor
supplied and labor received. In other words, exploitation, if exists, persists but tends to
be smaller and smaller in the long-run, if we agree on this particular measure of the size
of exploitation.
Related literature. This paper is part of the ongoing research project on the persis-
tence of exploitation. After Roemer (1982a, 1982b)’s seminal work on modern theory of
exploitation, critics have touched the issue of persistence by arguing that capital accu-
mulation would drive profit to zero when Roemer (1982b)’s static model is run for many
periods, however, without explicitly analyzing intertemporal decisions (Devine & Dym-
ski, 1991; Hahnel, 2006; Skillman, 1995). Veneziani (2007), for the first time, discusses
this issue in an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, which is the closest model
to ours in this paper.
Veneziani (2007, 2013) presents a model of subsistence economy with linear technol-
ogy but mainly focus on the reproducible solutions without saving. They show that labor
time tends to be egalitarian in the limit, which is generalized to reproducible solutions
without any restrictions on the saving behavior in this paper (see Theorem 3).
Moreover, Veneziani (2007, 2013) assume stationary prices, i.e., the price of inputs is
identical with that of outputs at the same period, which leads to the fact that profit rate
converges to zero. In this paper, we assume that inputs and outputs are transacted in
the beginning and at the ending of the period respectively and thus could have different
prices. Therefore, we observe a different asymptotic behavior of the prices — there exists
an RS such that WPt exploitation disappears in the limit while real profit rate does not
vanish there.
This feature brought by the assumption of non-stationary prices is shared with
Kaneko and Yoshihara (2019)’s model of international trade in pre-industrial world
economies, which, however, differs from our model in two aspects. First, they focus
on the interior reproducible solution as Veneziani (2007, 2013). Second, there is no in-
ternational labor market in their model. In this sense, our model can also be seen as a
model of international trade with labor market and savings, a generalization of Kaneko
and Yoshihara (2019).
All of the papers mentioned above show only the asymptotically egalitarian labor
allocation in the interior RS, while in this paper we distinguish two different types of long-
run behaviors for the first time and establish the persistence of exploitation in the sense
that pure workers are exploited in any finite periods. The RS without asymptotically
egalitarian labor allocation is observed in Galanis et al. (2019), another current paper
that is close to ours, which, however, “crucially relies on a strictly positive rate of time
preference” (Galanis et al., 2019, p. 41).
Theorem 1 shows the equivalence of positive real profit and exploitation in the whole
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life, and the correspondence of exploitation within-period and class status, and thus
relates this paper to the literature on the relationship among exploitation, profit and class
structure (Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1982a; Veneziani & Yoshihara, 2015; Yoshihara &
Kaneko, 2016). Also, our discussion on the use of WL exploitation and WPt exploitation
is relevant to the long-lasting efforts to find an appropriate definition of exploitation
(Ferguson & Steiner, 2018; Yoshihara, 2017; Yoshihara & Veneziani, 2018).
2 Reproducible Solution
Economic Environment. Suppose that there are N identical producers living for
T periods, denoted by N with the genetic element ν, requiring for subsistence a vector
b ∈ Rn+ in each period. They have the same knowledge of a certain Leontief input–output
technology (A,L) with the following assumption1.
Assumption 1. The nonnegative matrix A is productive, indecomposable and labor is
indispensable. That is, for the matrix A ≥ 0,
(i) ∃x ≥ 0, x−Ax ≥ 0;
(ii) ∀i, j, ∃t, (A)tij > 0; and
(iii) L > 0.
Let the initial endowment be Ω = (ω11 , . . . , ω
N
1 ) and denote the economy environment
by E(Ω) = 〈N , A, L, b,Ω〉. If the total endowment is just sufficient to reproduce, i.e.,∑
ν∈N
ων1 = ω ≡ A(I −A)−1(Nb)
denote the initial endowment by Ω and thus the economy E(Ω).
t− 1 t
A(xνt + y
ν
t ) x
ν
t + y
ν
t
Period t
pt−1 pt
Figure 1: The time structure of the economy.
Time Structure. We assume that (i) production takes time, (ii) wage is paid post
factum, and (iii) non-stationary price, i.e., prices of inputs and that of outputs may differ.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, define period t be the time interval starting from time
t − 1 to time t, i.e., [t − 1, t]. Let xνt be the activity level of self-operated production,
1For a, b ∈ R, we use ≥ and ≤ to denote the weak inequality. For a = (a1, . . . , an), b = (b1, . . . , bn),
a = b means ai ≥ bi for all i; a ≥ b means a = b and a 6= b; a > b means ai > bi for all i.
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and yνt the activity level that ν hires others to operate during period t. First, we assume
that it takes one period to produce. In other words, means of production A(xt + yt) is
inputted at time t−1, the beginning of period t, and outputs xt+yt will be generated at
time t, the end of period t. Second, wages wt are paid at time t, though labor is inputted
at time t− 1. Finally, let pt be the prices at time t, then the prices of outputs pt could
be different from that of inputs pt−1.
The first assumption that production takes time is a conventional assumption in
classical economics. It is one of the key assumptions that bring about positive profit rate
in equilibrium with constant-return-to-scale technology, in contrast with zero profit in
neoclassical model (e.g., Roemer, 1981, pp.81-86).
Secondly, the assumption that wage is paid post factum is usually adopted in Sraffian
tradition following Sraffa (1960), while in Marxian tradition, wage is typically assumed
to be advanced at the beginning of the period. However, the choice between these two
assumptions has no essential impact on the results because it is equivalent for the agent
to pay w at the beginning or (1+pi)w and the end where pi is the profit rate (e.g., Bidard,
2004, p.39; Abraham-Frois & Berrebi, 1997, p. 55).
Finally, although the assumption of stationary prices, i.e., prices of inputs and that
of outputs are the same, is conventional in relevant literature (e.g. Galanis et al., 2019;
Roemer, 1982a; Veneziani, 2007), we do not adopt here for two reasons. First, it is
natural to have non-stationary prices in the intertemporal setting. Outputs generated in
this period is used as inputs in the next and thus the sell of outputs in period t and the
purchase of inputs in t+ 1 are just two sides of the same coin and thus should have the
same prices. Then for the production in period t, the prices of inputs (same as the prices
of outputs in the previous period) could be different from that of outputs (same as the
prices of inputs in the next period). Second, allowing non-stationary prices would make
a substantial difference in the possible trajectory of the prices as shown in Lemma 4.2
and Kaneko and Yoshihara (2019).
The Programming Problem. Let the price vector be (p, w) = {pt−1, wt}Tt=1, and
the agent ν’s lifetime plan ξν = (xν , yν , zν , δν , ων) where xν = {xνt }Tt=1 is the lifetime
plan of activity levels operated by herself, yν = {yνt }Tt=1 the plan of activity levels that
ν hires others to operate, zν = {zνt }Tt=1 the plan of labor supply, δν = {δνt }Tt=1 the plan
of speculation which is purchased at the beginning and sold at the end of each period,
and ων = {ωνt }T+1t=2 the plan of endowments. Let Λνt = Lxνt + zνt be ν’s total labor
time at period t. The agent is assumed to choose ξν to solve the following minimization
programming problem (MP),
min Λν =
T∑
t=1
Λνt
s.t. pt(x
ν
t + δ
ν
t ) + (pt − wtL)yνt + wtzνt = ptb+ ptωνt+1
pt−1A(xνt + y
ν
t ) + pt−1δ
ν
t ≤ pt−1ωνt
Lxνt + z
ν
t ≤ 1
ωνT+1 = ων1
xνt , y
ν
t , ω
ν
t = 0, zνt ≥ 0
(MP)
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In other words, the agent ν is assumed to minimize the undiscounted labor time subject to
the constraint that (1) total revenue is sufficient to purchase the consumption goods and
the stock of materials for the next period; (2) the investment plan in both production
and speculation must be affordable in each period; (3) total labor performed in each
period cannot go beyond the physical limit which is normalize to one; and (4) she should
pass the resources to the next generation at least as much as she inherited.
Two things to be noted about the objective function. First, to minimize labor time
is equivalent to maximize utility representing the so-called leisure preference, i.e.,
uνt (c,Λ
ν
t ) = 1− Λνt
where c = b is the consumption vector, and Λνt ∈ [0, 1] the labor supply. That is, the
agent prefers to enjoy as much leisure time as possible after securing the subsistence goods
b. With the leisure preference, the economy is sometimes referred to the “subsistence
economy”(Roemer, 1982a; Veneziani, 2007), or following Kaneko and Yoshihara (2019)
“the pre-industrial economy” since such preference was ubiquitous in the pre-industrial
society by eighteenth-century, in which well-paid male workers took time off when they
could (e.g., Cunningham, 1980, 2014).
The idea of a regular working week is further challenged by the issue that
so exercised contemporary commentators, the habit for workers to work only
for as many hours or days as were necessary to keep them at a standard of
living to which they were accustomed. They worked the full day and the full
week only when wages were low and prices high. Rather than responding to
the incentive of high wages by working harder and longer, they did exactly
the opposite. In short, they were addicted to idleness. (Cunningham, 2014,
p. 41)
Moreover, the total labor time is aggregated without discount factor, with which it is easy
to have positive real profit rate and thus persistent exploitation as shown in Galanis et al.
(2019). However, for our purpose to examine the persistent exploitation as a objective
feature of capitalism from the viewpoint of historical materialism, it is not sufficient to
show persistent exploitation brought from subjective discount factor. Therefore, it is
appropriate to assume no discount factor here.
Denote the set of solutions by Aν(p, w). Then Aν(p, w) is not a singleton since there
are multiple solutions to this problem in general. First, it is equivalent for the agent to
operate herself on the one hand and to hire others to operate and supply her labor on
the market on the other hand. Indeed, for any ξν = (xν , yν , zν , δν , ων) ∈ Aν(p, w), we
have
ξ
ν
= (0, xν + yν , zν + Lxν , δν , ων) ∈ Aν(p, w) (1)
where xν + yν = {xνt + yνt }Tt=1, zν + Lxν = {zνt + Lxνt }Tt=1. Second, the agent could
choose to seize the day or to work hard and save for the future. Actually, the agent could
have different optimal saving paths associate with the equilibrium prices, as we can see
later (Lemma 3.4).
Reproducible Solution. Let xt =
∑
ν x
ν
t and similar notation with yt, zt, δt and ωt,
we define the reproducible solution (RS) as follows.
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Definition 1. A price vectors (p, w) and the associated lifetime plan Ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN )
is a reproducible solution (RS) for the economy E(Ω) if:
(i) ξν ∈ Aν(p, w),∀ν
(ii) xt + yt + δt = Nb+ ωt+1,∀t
(iii) A(xt + yt) + δt 5 ωt,∀t
(iv) Lyt = zt,∀t
(v) ωT+1 = ω1.
Condition (i) means that the economy activities must be consistent with the labor time
minimization, (ii) is the condition of reproducibility of the economy as a whole, (iii)
means that the investments in both production and speculation should not exceed the
endowment at aggregate level, (iv) is the equilibrium condition in labor market, and
finally (v) means that the physical endowment for the next generation should not be less
than the initial endowment in this generation, which is implied by the constraint of the
minimization program.
In this paper, we discuss the persistent exploitation in RS in general without any
ad hoc assumption on the saving behavior. However, we also consider the interior RS
defined below as a special case, since it is the main focus of the existing literature(e.g.,
Kaneko & Yoshihara, 2019; Veneziani, 2007).
Definition 2. An interior RS (IRS) for E(Ω) is an RS such that
ptA(x
ν
t + y
ν
t ) + ptδ
ν
t = ptω
ν
t+1,∀ν, ∀t
In other words, if the wealth at the end of the period, ptω
ν
t+1, is just sufficient to maintain
the investments (both in production and speculation), A(xνt + y
ν
t ) + δ
ν
t , we say there is
no saving and called such a reproducible solution an interior RS.
In the rest of this section, we provide some properties of the reproducible solutions.
For example, it is easy to see that if an RS exists, then there are multiple RSs. Indeed,
for any RS {(p, w),Ξ}, we have {(p, w),Ξ} is an RS, where Ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) and ξν is
defined by (1).
To avoid uninteresting technicalities, we focus on those solutions with wealth maxi-
mization (WM) such that if the agent ν supply zero labor at equilibrium she could choose
the path that maximizes the wealth, stated as an assumption below2.
Assumption 2 (WM). Let {(p, w),Ξ) be an RS for E(Ω). If there exists ν ∈ N such
that Λν = 0, then ν chooses yν and δν to maximize wealth pTω
ν
T+1.
Moreover, from now on we will only consider the economy E(Ω) with initial endow-
ment ω. Recall that ω = A(I − A)−1(Nb) is the minimal endowment to produce Nb
as net output. Therefore it is impossible to accumulate for the economy as a whole
as shown in Lemma 2.1 below. In other words, this assumption implies ‘simple repro-
duction’, which is consistent with the behavior assumption on labor time minimization
2This assumption plays a similar role as the “nonbenevolent capitalist” assumption (NBC) in Roemer
(1982a, 1988), Veneziani (2007). It is not strong in our study of persistent exploitation, since when T is
large no one can supply zero labor at RS, as we can see later in Lemma 3.4.
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or the leisure preference. Indeed, given any initial endowment greater than ω, it can
be shown that the social stock of material inputs would reduce to ω in the long-run.
Therefore, we focus on E(Ω) without loss of generality.
Lemma 2.1. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω). Then ωt = ω for any t. Furthermore,
ωνT+1 = ω
ν
1 for all ν ∈ N .
Proof. See Appendix A.
By fixing the end points ωνT+1, Lemma 2.1 provides the transversality conditions of
the optimal problem (MP)3. Moreover, with the fixed aggregate stock of material inputs
ω in each period, it can be shown that the aggregate production activity xt + yt to
generate Nb as net outputs must use up all the stock of material inputs ω in production
and therefore no speculation, δt = 0, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω). Define the value vector by v =
L(I −A)−1. Then
(1) δt = 0,∀t
(2) xt + yt = Nb+ ω,∀t
(3) A(xt + yt) = ω,∀t
(4)
∑N
ν=1 Λ
ν
t = vNb,∀t
(5)
∑N
ν=1 Λ
ν = vTNb.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, we have ωt = ω,∀t. Together with (ii) and (iii) in Definition 1,
we have
xt + yt + δt = Nb+ ω
A(xt + yt) + δt 5 ω
then xt + yt = (I − A)−1Nb and thus A(xt + yt) = ω, which establishes (1) and (3).
Suppose (2) does not hold, then we have
A(xt + yt) > A(Nb+ ω) = ω
contradicted with (3). Therefore, (2) holds. Then, we have xt + yt = Nb + ω = (I −
A)−1Nb. Then∑
ν
Λνt =
∑
ν
(Lxt + zt) =
∑
ν
L(xt + yt) = L(I −A)−1Nb = vNb
For (5), by Λν =
∑T
t=1 Λ
ν
t , we have
N∑
ν=1
Λν =
T∑
t=1
∑
ν
Λνt = vTNb
3The Euler equations, which provides information on the price system, will be derived in Lemma 3.3
after we establish the uniform rate of profit.
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Proposition 1 gives the aggregate properties of RS guaranteed by the restrictions
imposed by reproduction of the economy as a whole. From (2) we can see that all
commodities are produced at RS. Then together with the equilibrium condition in the
labor market, we can conclude that wage and price must be positive. Moreover, to
be consistent with these aggregate properties, the individual capital and reproducible
constraints must be binding.
Corollary 2.1. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then wt > 0 and pt > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 2.2. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then
(1) The capital constraint is binding, i.e.,
pt−1A(xνt + y
ν
t ) = pt−1ω
ν
t ,∀ν, ∀t
(2) The reproducibility constraint is binding, i.e.,
ptx
ν
t + (pt − wtL)yνt + wtzνt = ptb+ ptωνt+1,∀ν, ∀t
Proof. Both are established by the (2) and (3) of Proposition 1 and the positivity of
price from Corollary 2.1.
3 Exploitation
Exploitation as Unequal Exchange of Labor. We define exploitation as the un-
equal exchange of labor (henceforth, UEL exploitation), i.e., an agent is said to be
exploited if and only if the amount of labor she receives is less than that she contributes
in production. In our setting with linear technology, the amount of labor one receives
in each period via consumption goods b is well-defined as the labor value, vb, and thus
the amount of labor one receives in the whole life is vTb. Then we have the following
definition.
Definition 3. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω). We say in the whole life (WL)
ν is exploited⇔ Λν > vTb, ν is exploiting⇔ Λν < vTb
and within period t (WPt) ,
ν is exploited⇔ Λνt > vb, ν is exploiting⇔ Λνt < vb
Definition 3 generalizes the standard Okishio (1963)–Morishima (1973) form of UEL
exploitation in subsistence economies with linear technology to the intertemporal frame-
work. As mentioned in Section 1, the concept of UEL exploitation is well generalized
in a broad class of economies (Veneziani & Yoshihara, 2015; Yoshihara, 2010). Al-
though there are many alternative forms of UEL exploitation in general economies, as
discussed in Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015, 2017b), Yoshihara (2010, 2017), Yoshihara
and Veneziani (2018), all forms are reduced to Definition 3 in subsistence economies with
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linear technology. Therefore, our definition here is appropriate regardless of what is the
best form in general.
Moreover, the concept of UEL exploitation is of great normative relevance as discussed
in Section 1. In this paper, we will focus on its implications with respect to profits and
class structure in capitalism. Before that, we shall first discuss what positive profit
means in our setting with non-stationary prices, and characterizes the prices system at
RS.
Possibility of Positive Real Profits. Using the fact that all commodities are pro-
duced at RS, the following lemma first establishes the uniform rate of profit.
Lemma 3.1. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω). Assume WM. Then for any t there
exist pit such that
pt = (1 + pit)pt−1A+ wtL (2)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Moreover, to be consistent with no speculations at RS, δt = 0, as shown in Propo-
sition 1, the profit rate should be large sufficient to induce the agents to invest on pro-
duction rather than speculations. Therefore, the real profit rate should be nonnegative,
i.e.,
(1 + pit)pt−1 = pt,∀t (3)
otherwise the agent would speculate to save labor. However, since we assume non-
stationary prices, the nominal rate of profit pit can be negative. Indeed, in the case
with deflation, pt < pt−1, even with some negative profit rate the agent would prefer
productive investments to speculations. Nevertheless, the nominal profit rate has a
lower bound since prices are positive by Corollary 2.1. The reasoning above is presented
formally in the following lemma which characterizes the relationship between prices and
profit rates at RS and defines the possibility of positive real profits (PPRP).
Lemma 3.2. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then
(i) (1 + pit)pt−1 = pt and pt = wtv,∀t.
(ii) (1 +pit)pt−1 ≥ pt ⇒ pt > wtv. In this case, we say there is a possibility of positive
real profits (PPRP).
(iii) pit + 1 > 0,∀t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
So far we derive the uniform profit rate (2) and nonnegative real profit rate (3)
by considering the agent’s investment decisions within each period. The choice among
alternative sectors helps to establish the uniform rate of profit (Lemma 3.1), and the
trade off between productive and speculative investments leads to the nonnegative real
profit rate (Lemma 3.2). Both are common features shared with the static models
(e.g., Roemer, 1982a). Contrarily, equation (4) in the following lemma is established by
considering the agent’s intertemporal trade-offs in the allocation of labor along the life.
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Lemma 3.3. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then
wt+1 = (1 + pit+1)wt,∀t (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (4) is the Euler equations for MP, derived from the standard perturbation
method. By rearranging, we have
1
wt
=
1 + pit+1
wt+1
,∀t (5)
To see the intuition, consider a deviation whereby the producer works more in period t
to earn one more dollar, which she invests and earns a return (1 + pit+1) and hence can
work less next period. To be optimal at RS, this marginal deviation should lead to the
same labor time. Indeed, the left hand side of equation (5) is the amount of extra labor
to earn one more dollar in period t, while the right hand side is the amount of labor
saved in next period thanks to the return (1 + pit+1).
Note that this specific information provided by Lemma 3.3 on the sequence of wages
is the product of labor minimization. Because of the leisure preference, wages are in-
volved in the intertemporal trade-offs as in Veneziani and Yoshihara (2017a, Lemma 2,
p. 453) and Kaneko and Yoshihara (2019), contrasted with the monotonic preference
over consumption goods where wages do not appear in the Euler equations (See e.g.
Lemma C.1 in Appendix C and Galanis et al., 2019, Lemma 3, p. 37).
By Lemma 3.1 and 3.3, the price system (p, w) for any possible reproducible solu-
tions must satisfies (2) and (4), from which (p, w) can be determined recursively by the
initial prices (p0, w1) and the sequence of nominal profit rate {pit}. Moreover, with these
characteristics of price system at RS, the following proposition shows that if there is
possibility of positive real profit at the beginning then it is so in every period and vice
versa.
Proposition 2. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be any RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then
(1 + pi1)p0 − p1 ≥ 0⇔ (1 + pit)pt−1 − pt ≥ 0 ∀t (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that whether we have PPRP at each period is determined by
the initial prices p0, pi1 and w1, since
(1 + pi1)p0 − p1 ≥ 0⇔ (1 + pi1)p0(I −A)− w1L ≥ 0.
In other words, it is impossible to have PPRP in some periods but no PPRP at others.
Therefore, we can say there is PPRP or not at an RS with no ambiguity.
Exploitation, PPRP and Class. One of the main purposes of this paper is to ex-
amine the relationship between exploitation, capitalist profits and class status in the
intertemporal framework with non-stationary prices and no ad hoc assumption on sav-
ings. Specifically, we will focus on the following principles that are well-established in
static framework.
12
First, as an indicator of the overall economy, UEL exploitation is equivalent to positive
profit rate in inegalitarian capitalist economy. This is the so-called Fundamental Marxian
Theorem (FMT) originally developed by Okishio (1963), capturing the Marxian percep-
tion of capitalism as an exploitative system. Second, exploitation status corresponds to
the class membership in the sense that pure workers are exploited while capitalists are
exploiters, as summarized in the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP)
proposed by Roemer (1982b). The third principle is the so-called Profit-Exploitation
Correspondence Principle (PECP) proposed by Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015). It
captures the idea that in any economic equilibrium, positive profits imply that each
propertyless worker is exploited and vice versa. This principle differs in two aspects
from FMT: (i) with positive total profits, PECP requires each propertyless worker is
exploited while FMT just implies that the working class is exploited as a whole; (ii)
zero profit implies no exploitation based on FMT but not so according to PECP4.
There have been a lot of discussions on the robustness of these three principles in
general economic environments, and all except PECP are problematic (Yoshihara, 2017).
However, all of the three principles are well-established with linear technology in static
framework5. In this section, we will examine them in the intertemporal framework with
non-stationary prices and no ad hoc assumption on saving behaviors.
From the individual binding constraints in Corollary 2.2, we can see that within each
period the agent should work to earn sufficient wage revenue to cover the gap between the
total expenditure ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1 and the property income (1 + pit)pt−1ω
ν
t . Then using the
characterizations of the prices system, we have the labor time as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then
(1) The labor time within period t is
Λνt =
ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1 − (1 + pit)pt−1ωνt
wt
,∀t,∀ν
(2) The labor time in the whole life
Λν =
T∑
t=1
ptb
wt
− (1 + pi1)p0ω
ν
1
w1
+
pTω
ν
T+1
wT
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that ωνT+1 = ω
ν
1 by Lemma 2.1 therefore the total labor time Λ
ν is invariant with
respect to the saving behaviors, i.e., the choice of {ωνt }Tt=1. Moreover, in the economy
E(Ω), RSs with the different prices system could have different distributions of total
labor time (Λν)ν∈N , even with the same initial distribution of physical endowments Ω.
This is because different price systems could lead to different distributions of wealth.
Finally, compare the RSs with the same prices (p, w) and thus the same total labor time,
the agent’s saving behavior would influence the labor time within each period. In other
4See Veneziani and Yoshihara (2015, 2017b), Yoshihara (2017) for detailed discussions.
5In recent literature, these principles are also generalized into various intertemporal settings without
saving (Veneziani, 2007; Yoshihara & Kaneko, 2016).
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words, Λν is fixed once the price system (p, w) and the initial endowment ων1 are given,
while the choice among different paths of ωνt determines her intertemporal allocation of
labor time {Λνt }Tt=1.
Theorem 1. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Denote the set of propertyless
agent at period t by Wt ≡ {ν ∈ N | ωνt = 0}. Then
(i) ∀ν ∈ W1, (1 + pi1)p0 ≥ p1 ⇒ Λν > vTb.
(ii) ∀ν ∈ Wt, (1 + pit)pt−1 ≥ pt ⇒ Λνt > vb,∀t.
(iii) ∀ν ∈ N , (1 + pi1)p0 = p1 ⇒ Λν = vTb
(iv) If {(p, w),Ξ} is an IRS, then (1 + pit)pt−1 = pt ⇒ Λνt = vb,∀t,∀ν
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 is one of the main results in our paper. First, (i) and (iii) together
establish the FMT with respect to WL exploitation. That is, WL exploitation exists
if and only if PPRP, for the economy with W1 6= ∅. Indeed, we have PECP as well —
each ν ∈ W1 is WL exploited if and only if PPRP. Second, in terms of WPt exploitation,
we have both FMT and PECP for IRS from (ii) and (iv). Finally, (ii) means that pure
workers are WPt exploited and from the expression of labor time in Lemma 3.4 it is easy
to see that any pure capitalist must be exploiter within period t. Therefore, we have
CECP for any RS in terms of WPt exploitation. The above discussions are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Exploitation, profit and class..
FMT CECP PECP
Exploitation WPt IRS X IRS
Exploitation WL X X
Note that for RS in general (i) FMT and PECP do not hold with respect to WPt
exploitation since some producer may be exploited WPt even when there is no PPRP
— one can work more in period t to save in the next if there is another one does the
opposite; (ii) CECP fails in terms of WL exploitation because class membership may
change along the life without changing the WL exploitation status — a WL exploited
agent would be a capitalist in some period if she saves in the previous periods and there
is other agent doing the opposite. Indeed, Example 1 shows the existence of such RS
with particular saving behaviors as counterexamples with the help of Theorem 2 below.
Example 1. For the economy E(Ω) with W1 6= ∅, if there is an RS {(p, w),Ξ} with no
PPRP, i.e., p0(1 +pi1) = p1, then there exists an RS with the same price (p, w) such that
exploitation exists within period t for some t.
Therefore, we can conclude that
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(1) for RS in general, it is appropriate to use the definition of WL exploitation to dis-
cuss the relationship between exploitation and positive profits, and WPt exploita-
tion to discuss the relationship between exploitation status and class membership;
(2) for IRS in particular, WPt exploitation is meaningful for the discussions on the
relationship among exploitation, profits and class, as established in the existing
literature (e.g. Veneziani, 2007; Yoshihara & Kaneko, 2016).
Existence of RS. Given any sequence of profit rate pi = {pit}Tt=1 such that pit + 1 >
0,∀t. For any initial prices (p0, w1), let p(p0, w1, pi) be the sequence of prices obtained
from
wt = (1 + pit)wt−1 (7a)
pt = (1 + pit)pt−1A+ wtL (7b)
Let
Υ = {(Auν)ν∈N | uν = 0,
∑
ν
uν = (I −A)−1(Nb)}
and the set of initial endowment be
∆(p0, w1, pi) ≡ {(ων1 )ν∈N ∈ Υ | 0 ≤ Ψ(ων1 ) ≤ T, ∀ν}
where
Ψ(ων1 ) =
T∑
t=1
ptb
wt
− (1 + pi1)p0ω
ν
1
w1
+
pTω
ν
1
wT
(8)
In the economy E(Ω) for any Ω ∈∆(p0, w1, pi), denote the set of labor supply of agent ν
by
Zν(p0, w1, pi,Ω) = {zν = {zνt }t=1,...,T |
∑
t
zνt = Ψ(ω
ν
1 ), 0 ≤ zνt ≤ 1}
and let
Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω) ≡
∏
ν∈N
Zν(p0, w1, pi,Ω).
For any (zν) ∈ Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω), is there any RS with the path of labor time Λνt = zνt ?
The following proposition gives necessary and sufficient conditions. For any (zν) ∈ Z,
define wealth by
W νt+1 = wtz
ν
t + (1 + pit)W
ν
t − ptb, t = 1, · · · , T − 1,∀ν (9)
for all ν ∈ N .
Theorem 2. Given (p0, w1, pi) with p0 = p0A + w11+pi1L, the economy E(Ω) for any
Ω ∈∆(p0, w1, pi) has an RS with labor time (zν) ∈ Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω) if and only if
(1) W νt ≥ 0,∀t, ∀ν
(2)
∑
ν∈N W
ν
t = pt−1ω, ∀t
where W ν1 = p0ω
ν
1 and W
ν
t defined by (9).
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Proof. (⇒) If the eoconomy E(Ω) has an RS with Λνt = zνt , then by Lemma 3.4, we have
W νt = pt−1ω
ν
t and thus (1) and (2) hold.
(⇐) If (1) and (2) hold, then define the profile Ξ(p0, w1, pi,Ω) with zν ∈ Zν by
xνt = δ
ν
t = 0, ∀t∀ν (10a)
ωνT+1 = ω
ν
1 and ω
ν
t =
W νt
pt−1ω
ω, t = 2, · · · , T (10b)
yν1 = u and y
ν
t =
W νt
pt−1ω
(I −A)−1(Nb), t = 2, · · · , T (10c)
where u is the vector assoicated with Ω ∈ Υ by the definition of Υ. Then it can be checked
that {p(p0, w1, pi),Ξ(p0, w1, pi,Ω)} satisfies all the conditions in Defintion 1 (RS). Indeed,
(ii) (iii) and (v) are straightforward since yt = (I − A)−1(Nb) and ωt = ω by (10).
For (i), it is obvious that the profile satisfies all the constraints in the minimization
program (MP), then by Lemma 3.4, the lifelong labor time Ψ(ων1 ) equal to the minimum
labor time, thus we have ξν(p0, w1, pi,Ω) ∈ Aν(p(p0, w1, pi)) for all ν. Condition (iv) is
obtained by the fact that zt = v(Nb), which is nontrivial and shown in the second part
of Lemma 3.5 below.
Lemma 3.5. (1) Given Ψ(ων1 ) defined in (8), we have∑
ν∈N
Ψ(ων1 ) = v(TNb)
(2) For any (zν) ∈ Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω), if the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, then we have∑
ν∈N
zνt = v(Nb), ∀t
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 2 gives the conditions for a path of labor allocation (zν) ∈ Z(p0, w1pi,Ω) to
be realized in the RS. Then the existence of RS can be shown by constructing a path
of labor allocation satisfies these conditions. Indeed, as shown in Appendix B, we first
establish the existence of IRS without any strong restrictions (Theorem B1), and then
construct a non-interior RS based on the IRS (Theorem B2).
4 Persistent Exploitation
Theorem 1 shows the condition of the emergence of exploitation — pure workers are
exploited if there is possibility of positive real profit. If this condition is met and ex-
ploitation emerges, will it disappear at some point or persist? To answer this question,
we turn to the long-term behavior of RS to explore the exploitative status at any fi-
nite period and the labor allocation in the infinite limit with the help of the following
definitions.
Definition 4 (persistence). A time-related property Pt is said to be persistent if for any
t > 0, Pt holds.
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Definition 5 (persistent exploitation). We say exploitation at an RS is persistent if
WPt exploitation exists for any t, i.e., ∀t, ∃ν ∈ N ,Λνt > vb.
Definition 6 (asymptotic equivalence). Two sequence ut and vt are asymptotically equiv-
alent, denoted by ut ∼ vt, if
lim
t→∞
ut
vt
= 1
Definition 7. At an RS, we say the labor allocation (Λνt ) is asymptotically egalitarian
if the labor time for all agent are asymptotically equivalent for each other, i.e.,
∀ν, µ ∈ N ,Λνt ∼ Λµt
An RS is asymptotically egalitarian if labor allocation is asymptotically egalitarian.
Note that persistence characterizes the situation in any finite periods, while asymp-
totics is used to describe the limiting behavior. For example, for the sequence ut = 1+1/t,
the property ut > 1 is persistent since it holds for any t > 0, however, we have ut con-
verges to 1 and thus is asymptotically equivalent to the sequence vt = 1. Similarly, it
is possible that an RS is asymptotically egalitarian but with persistent exploitation by
definition. Indeed, we will show that any RS is asymptotically egalitarian, while ex-
ploitation, if exists, is persistent. Specifically, if there is PPRP then pure workers are
exploited WPt for any t, even though labor time tends to be equalized in the limit. To
establish this result, we will first provide some asymptotic properties of prices system at
RS.
The Asymptotic Behavior of Prices.
Lemma 4.1. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Then the sequence ( ptwt )
decreasingly converge to the labor value v. That is
pt
wt
↓ v, as t→∞
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 and 3.3, we have
pt
wt
− pt+1
wt+1
=
(1 + pit+1)pt − pt+1
wt(1 + pit+1)
= 0
Therefore, the sequence {pt/wt} is decreasing. Moreover, by Lemma 3.1 and 3.3, we
have
wt = Π
t
τ=2(1 + piτ )w1 = Π
t
τ=1(1 + piτ )w0
pt = Π
t
τ=1(1 + piτ )p0A
t + Πtτ=1(1 + piτ )w0L
t−1∑
τ=0
Aτ
where w0 = w1/(1 + pi1). Then
pt
wt
=
p0
w0
At + L
t−1∑
τ=0
Aτ → 0 + L(I −A)−1 = v, t→∞
since the Frobenius root ρ(A) < 1 by the productiveness (Assumption 1).
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Lemma 4.2. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM, and pit be associated profit
rate. Define R ≡ 1/ρ(A)− 1 where ρ(A) is the Frobenius root of A.
(i) If lim supt→∞ pit < R, then limt→∞[(1 + pit)pt−1 − pt] = 0.
(ii) If lim inft→∞ pit > R, then lim inft→∞[(1 + pit)pt−1 − pt]i > 0 for all i.
Proof. See Kaneko and Yoshihara (2019, Proposition 5).
Labor Allocation in the Limit. First, we examine labor allocation among agents in
the limit in the special case with interior RS.
Proposition 3. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be a IRS for E(Ω) with WM. Then
lim
t→∞Λ
ν
t = vb,∀ν
Proof. By Definition 2 and Lemma 3.4, we have
Λνt =
ptb− [(1 + pit)pt−1 − pt]A(xνt + yνt )
wt
≤ ptb
wt
→ vb, as t→∞
Then ∀ε > 0, let ε′ = ε/(N − 1),
∃T, ∀t > T, ptb
wt
< vb+ ε′
and therefore, Λνt < vb+ ε
′ < vb+ ε for all ν. Since
∑
µ Λ
µ
t = vNb by Proposition 1, we
have
Λνt = Nvb−
∑
µ 6=ν
Λµt
> Nvb−
∑
µ6=ν
(vb+ ε′)
= Nvb− (N − 1)(vb+ ε′)
= vb− ε
Thus we have vb− ε < Λνt < vb+ ε for all ε > 0. Then limt→∞ Λνt = vb,∀ν.
Proposition 3 is a replication of Veneziani (2007)’s main conclusion with different time
structure, and a generalization of Kaneko and Yoshihara (2019)’s results to the case with
labor market. Actually, the assumption of no saving turns out to be not necessary, as
shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Suppose that there is PPRP,
then
(i) WL exploitation exists in the limit, i.e.,
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
(Λνt − Λµt ) 6= 0
unless the the initial distribution of endowment is egalitarian in the sense that
(v − p0w0 )ων1 = constant,∀ν.
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(ii) Any RS is asymptotically egalitarian. Indeed,
lim
t→∞Λ
ν
t = vb,∀ν
Proof. For any ν and µ in N , by Lemma 3.4 we have
Λν − Λµ ≡
T∑
t=1
(Λνt − Λµt ) =
(
pT
wT
ωνT+1 −
p0
w0
ων1
)
−
(
pT
wT
ωµT+1 −
p0
w0
ωµ1
)
=
(
pT
wT
− p0
w0
)
(ων1 − ωµ1 )
by ωνT+1 = ω
ν
1 and ω
µ
T+1 = ω
µ
1 due to Lemma 2.1. Since
pT
wT
→ v, T →∞
by Lemma 4.1, we have
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
(Λνt − Λµt ) = lim
T→∞
(
pT
wT
− p0
w0
)
(ων1 − ωµ1 ) =
(
v − p0
w0
)
(ων1 − ωµ1 ) ≡ S∗ (11)
and S∗ 6= 0 unless
(
v − p0w0
)
ων1 =
(
v − p0w0
)
ωµ1 , which establishes (i).
For (ii), we first show that limt→∞(Λνt − Λµt ) = 0 by the fact that the infinite series∑∞
t=1(Λ
ν
t − Λµt ) is convergent for any ν, µ ∈ N . Indeed, denote the partial sum of the
series by
St =
t∑
t′=1
(Λνt′ − Λµt′)
Then, as shown above in (11), we have limt→∞ St = S∗, and therefore
Λνt − Λµt = St − St−1 → S∗ − S∗ = 0, as t→∞
In addition,
∑
ν∈N Λ
ν
t = vNb holds for any t, then limt→∞ Λ
ν
t = 0,∀ν ∈ N . Indeed,
we have ∑
µ∈N
Λµt +
∑
µ6=ν
µ∈N
(Λνt − Λµt )→ v(Nb), t→∞
and ∑
µ∈N
Λµt +
∑
µ6=ν
µ∈N
(Λνt − Λµt ) = NΛνt
Thus
lim
t→∞Λ
ν
t = vb,∀ν
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Part (i) shows that WL exploitation will never disappear even in the limit if there
is PPRP and inegalitarian initial distribution of wealth. In other words, the system is
exploitative as a whole overall regardless of individual saving behaviors.
The second part of Theorem 3 shows that any RS is asymptotically egalitarian —
the sequence of labor allocations converges to equal labor distribution in the limit, irre-
spective of the asymptotic behavior of the real profit.
As shown in Lemma 4.2, it is possible to have an RS with real profit rate not con-
vergent to zero. In other words, there could exists an RS with PPRP in the limit but
no WPt exploitation there, which is not observed in the setting with stationary prices
since profit rate always converges to zero (Veneziani, 2007, Theorem 2, p. 201). The
existence of such an RS is another evidence to support our claim in previous section
— it is more appropriate to use WL exploitation rather than WPt exploitation when
discussing the relationship between exploitation and positive profit. With Example 1
we have an RS with WPt exploitation even when there is no PPRP. Theorem 3 here
together with Lemma 4.2 show that we could have an RS with PPRP in the limit but
no WPt exploitation.
Persistence of Exploitation. Furthermore, if one adopts the definition of strong
persistence which requires the existence of WPt exploitation in the limit, then Theo-
rem 3 can be interpreted as an impossibility theorem (e.g., Kaneko & Yoshihara, 2019;
Veneziani, 2007). However, if we care about not just the limit that will never be reached
but the exploitation status within finite periods, then we should also examine the weak
persistence, which would be done below.
Proposition 4. Let {(p, w),Ξ} be an RS for E(Ω) with WM. Suppose that there is PPRP
and that Wt 6= ∅ for all t. Then for any finite t,
Λνt > vb,∀ν ∈ Wt
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 with PPRP we have pt > wtv, then
Λνt =
ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1
wt
= ptb
wt
> vb,∀t, ∀ν ∈ Wt
Proposition 4 shows that pure workers are exploited persistently as long as PPRP.
Therefore, exploitation is persistent in any RS with pure workers all the time. For
example, the pure workers at the beginning in any IRS would remain pure workers,
so exploitation is persistent in IRS if there is pure workers exploited. In conclusion,
if there is PPRP then pure workers are exploited persistently, even though the RS is
asymptotically egalitarian.
Both results, the persistence of exploitation and the asymptotically egalitarian la-
bor allocation, provide useful information about the long-term behavior of exploitation.
Persistent exploitation captures the Marxian perception of capitalism as an enduring
exploitative system — exploitation will never disappear at any time as long as capital-
ism survives, while asymptotically egalitarian labor allocation tells us more about the
asymptotic trends of exploitation.
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It means that labor time tends to be equalized, which implies the disappearance of
WPt exploitation in the limit. Moreover, it implies that after some point the degree of
exploitation can be arbitrary small, measured by the difference between labor supplied
and labor received. In other words, exploitation exists all the time but tends to be
smaller and smaller in the long-run, if we agree on this particular measure of the size of
exploitation.
These asymptotic trends of exploitation implied by asymptotically egalitarian labor
allocation at RS is not contradictory with the Marx’s view of capitalism as one stage in
human history that is neither sustainable nor permanent. Therefore, it is sufficient to
show the persistence of exploitation in the sense that it persists in any finite period to
model ensuring exploitation in capitalism. We may ask too much in the search of mech-
anism to generate RS that is not asymptotically egalitarian as done in current literature.
That being said, to study the limiting behavior is also meaningful and informative.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present an intertemporal model of pr-industrial economies with linear
technology to study the persistence of exploitation, and show that pure workers are
exploited all the time except in the infinite limit if there is possibility of positive profits.
In our point of view, this is sufficient to conclude that exploitation is persistent since it
does exists in any period, even though labor allocation tends to be equalized. Therefore,
in the subsistence economy with positive real profit and inegalitarian distribution of
endowment, exploitation can not just emerge as shown in Roemer (1982b) but also
persist without any imperfectness of the market.
We has also explored the relationship among exploitation, positive profits and class
status and generalized all of the FMT, PECP and CECP with appropriate definition
of UEL exploitation respectively. Contrary to the existing literature focusing on interior
RS, our discussion suggests that the distinction between exploitation within period and
that in the whole life is useful in general.
There are several limitations of this model. First, we show the long-run behavior of
exploitation by that of the prices system, while the latter is derived as a characteristics
of the RS — the prices system must have such a property by the definition of RS. It says
little about what drives the prices to behavior in this way, and therefore provides little
insight on what makes exploitation disappear in the limit.
Second, we only focus on the pre-industrial economy with leisure preference according
to which each producer try to minimize labor time after obtaining the subsistence good.
The most direct extension of this model is to study the case with monotonic preference
(see Appendix C and Galanis et al., 2019) and furthermore the accumulating economies
where producer’s object function is to maximize revenue (e.g., Roemer, 1982a, Ch. 4).
For the accumulating economies, we could expect that labor would become scarce relative
to capital accumulated after some point if the size of population is assumed to be fixed,
which would drive the profit rate to zero in finite periods. Then we would need some other
mechanism to ensure the persistence of exploitation, which is left for further exploration.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. By (ii) and (iii) of Defintion 1, we have
A(xt + yt) 5 ωt
(I −A)(xt + yt) = Nb+ ωt+1 − ωt
and then
ωt = (I −A)ω +Aωt+1 (12)
Therefore, we have ωt+1 = ω ⇒ ωt = ω. Since ωT+1 = ω1 = ω, we have ωt = ω for all t
by induction.
Again, by (12), we have ωt = ω ⇒ ωt+1 = ω. Indeed, ωt = ω ⇒ A(ωt+1 − ω) 5 0.
Suppose that ωt+1 ≥ ω, then A(ωt+1 − ω) ≥ 0 contradicted. Thus, we have ωt+1 6≥ ω.
Therefore, ωt+1 = ω since ωt = ω,∀t as shown above. Since ω1 = ω, we have ωt = ω for
all t by induction.
Together with ωνT+1 = ων1 for all ν, the equality must hold. Indeed, suppose not,
then ωT+1 > ω, contradicted.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. Consider the RS such that xνt = 0,∀ν, ∀t without loss of gener-
ality, then yt = Nb + ω > 0,∀t by (2) of Proposition 1. First, we have wt > 0 from
the equilibrium of the labor market. Suppose wt = 0, then zt = 0, contradicted with
zt = Lyt > 0.
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Next, we show that pt = wtL. Suppose, on the contrary, that pjt < wtLj for some
j, then we have yνjt = 0 for all ν. Otherwise, by setting y
ν
jt = 0 the agent ν is able to
reduce zνt if Λ
ν 6= 0, or the increase pTωνT+1 when Λν = 0 by WM. Therefore, yjt = 0,
contradicted with yt > 0.
Finally, since L > 0 by Assumption 1, pt = wtL > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By Proposition 1, we have xt+yt = Nb+ω > 0,∀t. Then for any t,
there exist some ν such that xνt + y
ν
t > 0. Suppose, on the contrary, that pijt > piit, then
if Λν > 0, we have xνit + y
ν
it = 0 contradicted. If Λ
ν = 0, by WM, we have xνit + y
ν
it = 0
contradicted.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. From xt + yt > 0 we have x
ν
t + y
ν
t > 0 for some ν. Suppose that
(1 + pit)pj,t−1 < pjt for some j. Then it is feasible to replace xνt + y
ν
t by some δ
ν
t with
δνjt > 0 to satisfy the capital constraint but making the reproducibility constraint slack.
Therefore, we have (1 + pit)pt−1 = pt, which implies
(1 + pit)pt−1A = ptA⇒ pt − wtL = ptA⇒ pt(I −A) = wtL
Therefore, we have either
(1 + pit)pt−1 = pt ⇒ pt = wtv
or
(1 + pit)pt−1 ≥ pt ⇒ (1 + pit)pt−1A ≥ ptA
sinceA is indecomposable and thus pt > wtv. Finally, pit > −1 follows from (1+pit)pt−1 =
pt ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Consider a one-period perturbation at period t + 1, let ω′t+1 =
ωt+1 + ∆. Then in the perturbation path,
Λ′t + Λ
′
t+1 = Λ
ν
t + Λ
ν
t+1 +
(
pt∆
wt
− (1 + pit+1)pt∆
wt+1
)
By the optimality, we have pt∆wt −
(1+pit+1)pt∆
wt+1
≥ 0,∀∆. Therefore,
pt
wt
=
(1 + pit+1)pt
wt+1
⇒ wt+1 = (1 + pit+1)wt
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 3.1 and 3.3 we have
(1 + pit)pt−1 − pt = (1 + pit)[(1 + pit−1)pt−2A+ wt−1L]− (1 + pit)pt−1A− wtL
= (1 + pit)[(1 + pit−1)pt−2 − pt−1]A
Then
(1 + pit)pt−1 − pt =
t∏
τ=2
(1 + piτ )[(1 + pi1)p0 − p1]At−1 (13)
Together with 1 + pit > 0,∀t from Lemma 3.2, we have (6).
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Proof of Lemma 3.4. By Corollary 2.2 and Lemma 3.1, we have
(1 + pit)pt−1ωνt = (1 + pit)pt−1A(x
ν
t + y
ν
t )
= (pt − wtL)(xνt + yνt )
= ptx
ν
t + (pt − wtL)yνt − wtLxνt
= ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1 − wtzνt − wtLxνt
= ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1 − wtΛνt
Therefore, Λνt =
ptb+ptω
ν
t+1−(1+pit)pt−1ωνt
wt
by wt > 0.
By Lemma 3.3, we have
Λνt + Λ
ν
t+1
=
ptb
wt
+
ptω
ν
t+1
wt
− (1 + pit)pt−1ω
ν
t
wt
+
pt+1b
wt+1
+
pt+1ω
ν
t+2
wt+1
− (1 + pit+1)ptω
ν
t+1
wt+1
=
ptb
wt
+
ptω
ν
t+1
wt
− pt−1ω
ν
t
wt−1
+
pt+1b
wt+1
+
pt+1ω
ν
t+2
wt+1
− ptω
ν
t+1
wt
=
ptb
wt
+
pt+1b
wt+1
− pt−1ω
ν
t
wt−1
+
pt+1ω
ν
t+2
wt+1
Therefore,
Λν =
T∑
t=1
Λνt =
T∑
t=1
ptb
wt
− (1 + pi1)pkT−1ω
ν
1
w1
+
pTω
ν
T+1
wT
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 3.2, we have
(1 + pi1)p0 ≥ p1 ⇔ (1 + pit)pt−1 ≥ pt,∀t⇒ pt > wtv,∀t
(i) By Lemma 3.4 (2) and ωνT+1 = ω
ν
1 = 0, we have
Λν =
T∑
t=1
ptb
wt
> vTb
(ii) By Lemma 3.4 (1) and ωνt = 0, we have
Λνt =
ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1
wt
= ptb
wt
>
wtvb
wt
= vb
(iii) By Lemma 3.4, we have
Λνt =
pt
wt
(b+ ωνt+1 − ωνt ) = v(b+ ωνt+1 − ωνt )
Therefore,
Λν =
∑
t
Λνt = vTb+ v(ω
ν
T+1 − ων1 ) = vTb
as ωνT+1 = ω
ν
1 by Lemma 2.1.
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(iv) By Definition 2, we have
Λνt =
ptb− [(1 + pit)pt−1 − pt]A(xνt + yνt )
wt
=
ptb
wt
= vb, ∀t,∀ν.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let
ψt ≡ pt(Nb) + ptω − (1 + pit)pt−1ω
wt
(14)
(1) From the proof of Lemma 3.4, we have
T∑
t=1
ψt =
T∑
t=1
pt(Nb)
wt
− (1 + pi1)p0ω
w1
+
ptω
wT
=
∑
ν
Ψ(ων1 )
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that ψt = v(Nb). Indeed, we have
ψt =
pt(Nb) + ptω − (1 + pit)pt−1A(I −A)−1(Nb)
wt
=
pt(Nb) + ptω − (pt − wtL)(I −A)−1(Nb)
wt
=
pt
wt
[I +A(I −A)−1 − (I −A)−1](Nb) + v(Nb)
= v(Nb)
(2) By equation (9) and condition (2) in Theorem 2, we have zt = ψt defined by (14)
while ψt = v(Nb) as shown above.
B Existence of RS
Theorem B1 (Existence of IRS). Given any sequence of profit rate pi = {pit}Tt=1 such
that pit + 1 > 0 for every t, and any sequence of prices p(p0, w1, pi), let (1 + pi1)
p0b
w1
5 1
hold. Let Ω ∈∆(p0, w1, pi) be such that
max
ν∈N
max
15t5T
(
pt
wt
− pt−1
wt−1
)
ων1 5
pT b
wT
Then, there exists an IRS for E(Ω) associated with the price sequence p(p0, w1, pi).
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Proof. Given the price sequence p(p0, w1, pi), every agent ν has the following profile of
optimal labor supplies:
Λ∗νt =
ptb+ ptω
ν
t+1 − (1 + pit)pt−1ωνt
wt
for each t = 1, . . . , T ; and
Λ∗ν =
T∑
t=1
ptb
wt
− (1 + pi1)p0ω
ν
1
w1
+
pTω
ν
T+1
wT
=
T∑
t=1
ptb
wt
− (1 + pi1)p0ω
ν
1
w1
+
pTω
ν
1
wT
.
By the property of the optimal lifetime labor supply Λν , non-saving action ωνt = ω
ν
1
for each t = 2, . . . , T is consistent with ν’s optimal action. Indeed, this is a necessary
condition for IRS. Then, each agent’s one-period optimal labor supply at period t is
given by
Λ∗νt =
ptb
wt
+
ptω
ν
1
wt
− (1 + pit)pt−1ω
ν
1
wt
=
ptb
wt
+
(
pt
wt
− pt−1
wt−1
)
ων1 by Lemma 3.3.
5 ptb
wt
by
(
pt
wt
− pt−1
wt−1
)
5 0 from Lemma 4.1.
5 p0b
w0
5 1 by (1 + pi1)
p0b
w1
5 1.
Moreover, as maxν∈N max15t5T
(
pt
wt
− pt−1wt−1
)
ων1 5 pT bwT holds, we have Λ
∗ν
t = 0 for each
t = 2, . . . , T and every ν ∈ N . Thus, {(Λ∗νt )ν∈N}t=1,...,T ∈ Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω) holds.
Then, according to (9), each agent’s wealth at each period t = 1, . . . , T is given by
W νt ≡ pt−1ων1 = 0. Moreover, by the definition of Υ,
∑
ν∈N W
ν
t = pt−1ω holds at each
period t. Therefore, by Theorem 2, there exists an IRS for E(Ω) associated with the
price sequence p(p0, w1, pi).
Theorem B2 (The existence of RS). Given any sequence of profit rate pi = {pit}Tt=1 such
that pit + 1 > 0 for every t, and any sequence of prices p(p0, w1, pi), let (1 + pi1)
p0b
w1
5 1
hold. Let Ω ∈∆(p0, w1, pi) be such that
max
ν∈N
max
15t5T
(
pt
wt
− pt−1
wt−1
)
ων1 5
pT b
wT
Let an IRS for E(Ω) associated with the price sequence p(p0, w1, pi) and the path of labor
time
{
(Λ∗νt )ν∈N
}
t=1,...,T
∈ Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω). Let
{
(l∗νt )ν∈N
}
t=1,...,T−1 be a sequence of
profiles of N real numbers, which satisfies the following condition:
(1)
∑
ν∈N l
∗ν
t = 0 for every t = 1, . . . , T − 1;
(2) Λ∗νt + l
∗ν
t ∈ [0, 1] for any ν ∈ N and every t = 1, . . . , T − 1;
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(3)
∣∣∣∑t′t=1 l∗νt ∣∣∣ 5 pt′ων1wt′ whenever ∑t′t=1 l∗νt < 0,∀ν ∈ N and every t′ = 1, . . . , T − 1;
(4)
∑T−1
t=1 l
∗ν
t 5 1 − pT bwT −
(
pT
wT
− pT−1wT−1
)
ων1 and
∑T−1
t=1 l
∗ν
t 5 pT bwT +
(
pT
wT
− pT−1wT−1
)
ων1
for any ν ∈ N .
Then, there exists a RS associated with the price sequence p(p0, w1, pi) and a sequence of
labor allocations
{
(Λ∗νt + l
∗ν
t )ν∈N , t=1,...,T ,
(
Λ∗νT −
∑T−1
t=1 l
∗ν
t
)
ν∈N
}
∈ Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω).
Proof. Given the specified
{
(l∗νt )ν∈N
}
t=1,...,T−1, there exists a suitable profile (4ων1 )ν∈N ∈
RnN such that
∑
ν∈N 4ων1 = 0, and l∗ν1 = p1w14ων1 and p1ων2 ≡ p1 (ων1 +4ων1 ) for any ν ∈
N . Likewise, there exists a suitable profile (4ων2 )ν∈N ∈ RnN+ such that
∑
ν∈N 4ων2 = 0,
and l∗ν2 =
p2
w2
(4ων1 +4ων2 )− p1w14ων1 and p2ων3 ≡ p1 (ων1 +4ων1 +4ων2 ) for any ν ∈ N .
Likewise, for t = 2, . . . , T − 1, there exists a suitable profile (4ωνt )ν∈N ∈ RnN+ such that∑
ν∈N 4ωνt = 0, and l∗νt = ptwt
(4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνt−1 +4ωνt )− pt−1wt−1 (4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνt−1)
and ptω
ν
t+1 ≡ pt
(
ων1 +4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνt−1 +4ωνt
)
for any ν ∈ N . Finally, l∗νT =
− pT−1wT−1
(4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνT−1) and pTωνT+1 ≡ pT (ων1 +4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνT−1 +4ωνT ) with
4ωνT ≡ −
(4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνT−1).
Then, for each agent ν, the following new profile of labor supplies {Λνt }t=1,...,T can
be defined:
Λν1 = Λ
∗ν
1 + l
∗ν
1 =
p1b
w1
+
p1
w1
ων2 −
p0
w0
ων1 =
p1b− (1 + pi1) p0ων1 + p1ων2
w1
;
Λνt = Λ
∗ν
t + l
∗ν
t =
ptb
wt
+
ptω
ν
t+1
wt
− pt−1ω
ν
t
wt−1
=
ptb− (1 + pit) pt−1ωνt + ptωνt+1
wt
for t = 2, . . . , T − 1;
and ΛνT = Λ
∗ν
T + l
∗ν
t =
pT b
wT
+
pTω
ν
T+1
wT
− pT−1ω
ν
T
wT−1
=
pT b− (1 + piT ) pT−1ωνT + pTων1
wT
.
By the definition of
{
(l∗νt )ν∈N
}
t=1,...,T−1, 0 5 Λ
ν
t 5 1 holds for every t = 1, . . . , T and
any ν ∈ N , and∑ν∈N Λνt = vNb holds for every t = 1, . . . , T . Thus, {(Λνt )ν∈N}t=1,...,T ∈
Z(p0, w1, pi,Ω) holds.
Then, according to (9), each agent’s wealth at each period t = 1, . . . , T is given by
W νt ≡ pt−1ωνt . Note that pt−1ωνt = pt−1
(
ων1 +4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνt−1
)
and wt−1
∣∣∣∑t−1k=1 l∗νk ∣∣∣ =
pt−1
(4ων1 + · · ·+4ωνt−1) 5 pt−1ων1 holds if ∑t−1k=1 l∗νk < 0. Thus, pt−1ωνt = 0 holds for
any ν ∈ N and every t = 1, . . . , T − 1. Moreover, by the definition of Υ, ∑ν∈N W νt =
pt−1ω holds at each period t. Therefore, by Theorem 2, there exists a RS for E(Ω)
associated with the price sequence p(p0, w1, pi).
C The Economies with Monotonic Preferences
Suppose that the agent’s preference is monotonic instead of leisure preference as we
assumed in the main text. Formally, assume the preference is represented by u(cνt )
which is a continuous, strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and homogeneous of
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degree one. Then the maximization problem becomes
max
T∑
t=1
u(cνt )
s.t. pt(x
ν
t + δ
ν
t ) + (pt − wtL)yνt + wtzνt = ptcνt + ptωνt+1
pt−1A(xνt + y
ν
t ) + pt−1δ
ν
t ≤ pt−1ωνt
Lxνt + z
ν
t ≤ 1
ωνT+1 = ων1
xνt , y
ν
t , ω
ν
t = 0, zνt ≥ 0
Lemma C.1. Suppose that {(p, w),Ξ)} where Ξ = (xν , yν , zν , δν , cν , ων)ν∈N is a RS for
the economy E(Ω, u). Then
u(cνt )
ptcνt
= (1 + pit+1)
u(cνt+1)
pt+1cνt+1
Proof. Since u is homogeneous of degree one, we have the agent’s utility as a linear
function of the expenditure at utility maximizers, i.e., vνt = kte
ν
t where e
ν
t is expenditure
and kt =
u(cνt )
ptcνt
. Now consider a one-period perturbation, if the agent save one dollar in
period t, she would loss kt at time t, but thanks to the return of that one dollar in next
period, (1 + pit+1), she would gain (1 + pit+1)kt+1. Therefore, at RS, we should have
kt = (1 + pit+1)kt+1 ⇒ u(c
ν
t )
ptcνt
= (1 + pit+1)
u(cνt+1)
pt+1cνt+1
Lemma C.1 shows the Euler equation in the economy with monotonic preference. In
contrast to the one in the main text, equation (4), it provides no information about the
wages sequence. Moreover, if we consider the stationary RS as in Galanis et al. (2019)
that cνt = c
ν for all t, then there exists a constant αt such that pt+1 = αtpt since u is
homogeneous degree one. Therefore, the Euler equation becomes
u(cν)
ptcν
= (1 + pit+1)
u(cν)
αtptcν
⇒ αt = (1 + pit+1)
Then pt+1 = (1+pit+1)pt. In other words, at stationary RS, there is no possibility of real
profit rate when there is no positive rate of time preference, the same result observed in
Galanis et al. (2019).
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